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Abstract 
In Norway, the dominance of neo-liberal ideas has resulted in a private planning practice 
whereby the developer is the principal actor in opaque negotiations between planning 
authorities and developers. We examine patterns of contact between stakeholders in 
urban development planning. Based on information obtained from a survey of the 145 
most populous municipalities in Norway, as well as from case studies in Oslo, Bergen 
and Trondheim, we find considerable interaction between the stakeholders involved in 
the planning process. The interaction patterns are different for civil society actors and 
private developers. We find that while developers have contacts with the planning 
authorities, the civil actors have contacts with the politicians. In the initial phase, i.e. 
before formal planning begins, this pattern is highly significant. Politicians frequently 
feel bound by negotiations and agreements that are made by the planners and the 
developers during the initial planning process. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Recent decades have seen a subtle change in the relations between urban planning actors 
in Norway and in the division of tasks between them. Today, urban development is 
largely left to the market insofar as development plans tend to be drafted, submitted and 
executed by private actors
1. Market actors tend therefore to occupy a principal role in 
                                                            
1 Private plan proposals are submitted under section 30 of the 1985 Planning and Building Act, which 
therefore includes all plans submitted to the municipal authorities by private actors and public authorities. 
This article concerns development plans submitted under the old law, not the new law which was adopted 
in 2008. The new law has not altered the principle of private planning, but it gives greater prominence to 
the planning type by setting out clearer requirements on procedural matters.    3 
urban planning as a result. Eighty per cent of all adopted development plans were 
submitted as private plan proposals. In Oslo, 82 per cent (63 of 78 plans) of all 
development plans were private plan proposals in 2009 (Statistics Norway, 2010). The 
service provided by municipal planning administrations has thus become much more 
procedural than in the past when the departments drafted and executed the planning 
themselves.  
 
Norway has therefore no longer a public planning monopoly; it was formally abolished in 
the Planning and Building Act from 1985. Norway is therefore currently undergoing a 
large-scale neo-liberal experiment in urban planning. Private actors in Norway, unlike 
those in many other countries, are entitled to propose draft development plans and submit 
them for political approval by local governments. There are strong links between these 
development plans and building applications in Norway. This type of planning is called 
project planning (Røsnes, 2005). Project plans are in-fill development plans tailor-made 
for small building projects in urban areas.  
 
This entitlement, dating from 1985, is the formal opportunity to submit project plans 
prepared by the private sector (Falleth et al., 2010ab; Kalbro et al., 2010). The right to 
submit planning proposals, which used to be an additional democratic right of civil 
society, has become a planning instrument for market actors, reflecting and further 
enabling their strengthened role in urban development. A private project plan is prepared 
by private actors, i.e. they are the actual planners in terms of working out a formal 
proposal, and they are also responsible for the planning process right up until final 
political approval is granted by the local government. The public planner is more often 
than not reduced to an executive officer who steers the plan through the formal political 
decision-making process. The planning administration is still responsible for the public 
consultation that is carried out between the time when initial political approval is given 
by the planning committee and final approval is granted by the local government.  
 
Both the old (1985) and the new (2008) Planning and Building Acts in Norway underline 
the importance of participation in planning procedures, with each having formal 
requirements concerning public and civil society participation aligned to the requirements 
for public notification, consultation, public inspection and objection/appeal facilities. 
Participation here includes being involved in the creation of the drafting of the plan, that 
is, that part of the planning process which market actors currently now perform. There is 
however reason to believe that the recent developments in planning practice, in respect of 
the high number of private plan proposals being made, will affect the ability of civil 
society and of the politicians to influence urban development. A paucity of contemporary 
studies of the possible consequences undoubtedly exists and, as such, the purpose of this 
article is to improve our knowledge of the situation. We ask the following questions. 
How can we best describe relations between the core actors involved in urban 
development? Which arenas do the various actors have access to? And, how does this 
affect their ability to influence planning in Norwegian towns and cities?  
 
Planning research has tended to focus on relations between planners and local 
communities; on methods enabling community participation as an aspect of a planning   4 
process managed by the planner. Very little has been done nationally or internationally on 
the more structural relations between actors, in relation, for example, to the role played 
by politics and politicians in urban planning (Bickerstaff & Walker, 2005; Graaf, 2009; 
Granberg, 2008; Holman, 2007, 2008). There are however some exceptions to this (see, 
Falleth et al., 2010, Saglie & Mäntysalo, 2010; Hanssen & Saglie, 2010; Tewdwr- Jones 
& Morphet, 2006).  
 
There are certain exceptions in political science as well: one is Stone‟s 1989 classic on 
regime theory, which focuses on stakeholder relations and urban development in Atlanta 
City. A similar study was carried out in Norway (Lyngstad, 2000); there is also 
Flyvbjerg‟s study of urban planning in Ålborg (Flyvbjerg,1991); and there are some 
individual studies of actors and roles in Norwegian planning (Bowotz & Høegh, 2005; 
Falleth et al., 2010; Nyseth, 2008). Little has however been done to elucidate how market 
actors as actual planners generate civil society participation in urban planning. This 
article should therefore provide new and important insights into a little studied theme.  
 
The article in structured within a theoretical framework and a presentation of the research 
design. The presentation of the findings is divided into the presentation of participation, 
the interactions between actors and the effects of the planning process on planning 
outcomes. Lastly, we sum up our findings and raise some further issues for planning 
research.  
 
2.  Actors, governance and arenas 
 
The public sector in Norway rests very firmly on a foundation of neo-liberal thinking, as 
does the public sector in other European and Nordic countries (Mydske et al., 2007). This 
is perhaps best exemplified by the implementation of a raft of New Public Management 
reforms in these countries. Public–private partnerships and the increasing use of market-
related mechanisms have been introduced into urban planning in line with this reform 
agenda. 
 
The rapid rise, in Norway, of private actors in planning can be interpreted in the light of 
these neo-liberal trends, something which has given private developers an extremely 
powerful position in urban development (Børrud, 2005; Røsnes, 2005; Nordahl, 2006; 
Falleth et al., 2010; Falleth & Saglie, 2011). The new division of labour between the 
public authorities and market actors is a politically desired arrangement – and an example 
of the much-discussed international shift from “government to governance” (Rhodes, 
1997). Governance and joint management in particular is typified by a greater 
preponderance of market and network forms of management in the public sector and 
specifically in urban planning. As is increasingly acknowledged, political authorities 
should govern not only by means of traditional hierarchical authority but also by working 
together with the private sector and civil society to achieve desired political goals for 
urban development (Stoker, 2000; Agger, 2005:28; Inns & Booher, 2004; Burns, 2000; 
Sehested, 2002). To identify the actors and factors influencing urban planning, we thus 
clearly need a more broadly conceived analytical approach.    5 
This article addresses the roles of, and interactions between, the planning administration, 
politicians, developers and other local organisations. It emphasises the initial and 
informal stage of the planning. That is to say the process before formal regulation occurs 
in terms of planning legislation. It is at the conclusion of this stage that private plan 
proposals are submitted to the municipal authorities for political approval. Formal 
routines have been developed in this context by the local municipality where the local 
authority meets the developers to discuss their planning ideas and proposals. There are no 
other arenas in which the other actors meet. The locally developed routines, bringing 
together local authorities and developers, provide for a closed meeting between developer 
and planning authority. They are often referred to as “preliminary conferences” or 
“advance meetings”. 
 
Politicians are rarely involved in the planning process per se. They are generally limited 
to participating in the final decision-making arrangements in the various political 
committees and in the context of local government structures more generally. This is in 
line with the logic of New Public Management with a clear division between politicians 
who set the wider regulatory framework and public administration staff who administers 
and implements planning decisions. Politicians have the formal power to reject, adapt or 
change a plan proposal later in the process, but the informal process nevertheless often 
binds them to a particular decision. Indeed they often acknowledge that they are bound 
by prior contacts with the actors involved, primarily those made in the initial meetings 
between the developer and the public administration as well as those proposals made in 
relation to development agreements (Falleth et al., 2010; Hansen & Saglie, 2010). 
 
Such preliminary conferences and meetings take place at an early, informal stage of the 
planning process – a period where statutory participation and consultation provisions do 
not yet formally apply. The legal requirement here is simply to make the planning 
requirements publically known. The timing of this announcement is legally unclear and 
unknown in practice. An actual opportunity to participate does not arise until the formal 
planning stage has been reached. The right to raise objections applies only after the plan 
has been adopted, termed here the execution stage. The purpose of active involvement in 
the preparation of the plans has not been spelled out in supplementary provisions, but for 
participation to occur it would normally have to take place during the drafting of the plan, 
before the formal procedures have been implemented and the plan has been considered 
by the municipality. At this stage of the planning process responsibility for the plan lies 
with the developer.  
 
The Planning and Building Act does not specify who is entitled to participate. Nor does it 
tell us how much power the actors involved should have. Schmitter (2002) classified 
several factors which in his view confer participatory rights. He divides actors into formal 
right-holders, holders of voting rights in a particular area, knowledge-holders, asset and 
entitlement-holders, stake-holders and status-holders. Status here refers to planning 
authority, financial means and social position. It is, however, difficult to circumscribe 
ownership rights. In relation to planning, this means that the local community is 
conceived of as a rights holder in a dual sense, by enjoying formal rights under the 
planning law and territorial rights associated with political elections. These local   6 
community participation rights are therefore both direct participatory rights and indirect 
participatory rights through the representative democracy system. Popularly elected 
representatives, for their part, possess two rights in the process: as representatives of the 
public and as the planning authority.  
 
Market actors also enjoy rights of crucial importance for the execution of development 
plans. They have the economic means and they will often hold property or other land-
related rights. Politicians are, moreover, dependent on market actors to achieve their own 
political goals. This is particularly true of policies aimed at accelerating the rate of home 
building. So while market actors lack voting rights, politicians need to take them 
seriously if they want their towns to grow and prosper. In addition, several public 
authorities enjoy formal participatory rights in planning. In this study however we shall 
be looking at the planning administration as the entity where the expertise resides; the 
entity which informs and liaises with the other actors; and that which handles private 
plans in line with both central and local government objectives and guidelines.  
 
 
Figure 1: Actors and their interrelation in urban development planning in a 
network governance perspective. 
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates all of the involved actors and their possible interrelations. Most 
planning theory addresses the planner as a conductor and the planner in interaction with 
the other actors in urban development. This study addresses the interactions between all 
actors. This opens up our ability to appreciate more fully the many interrelations involved 
in urban planning, interrelations which are often no specifically focused on in traditional 
planning research.    7 
 
It must however be understood that none of these groups of actors is homogeneous. In 
local communities, people and organisations can hold very different opinions about a 
plan, which is likely to complicate internal coordination and mobilisation. Their interests 
range from immediate neighbourhood concerns to shared interests over a wider area. This 
diversity of views can make it harder for politicians and market actors to interpret what 
the local community wants. On the one hand, when many actors hold different opinions, 
the room for manoeuvre will be wide; but diversity can also hamper efforts to work 
together with the involved stakeholders. In the same way, there are serious and less 
serious market actors. Some know what planning means in practice and how the system 
works while others may not have been involved in a planning exercise before or are 
unwilling to fulfil their legal duty to consider interests other than their own. Politicians of 
course belong to different parties and have different opinions on planning, urban 
development and market actors. 
 
The local community is perhaps the weakest institutionalised entity in planning. It is a 
group of voluntary actors with few available resources to spend on development plans. 
These people may lack the capacity to participate to the same degree as the public 
authorities and private actors. This gives developers, planning administrations and 
politicians an opportunity to align themselves with the interest groups of their choice, to a 
certain degree at least, and may even set groups against one another. In other words, 
community interest groups are used strategically by private actors to advance their own 
interests in a given development plan. 
 
3.  The survey 
 
This presentation is based on a study from 2007-08 of one hundred randomly selected 
development plans (50 from 1987 and 50 from 2005); qualitative case studies in three of 
the largest urban municipalities in Norway, namely Bergen, Oslo and Trondheim; and a 
comprehensive survey of various respondents in the 145 most populous municipalities in 
Norway. The year 1987 was chosen because this was the first year in which most plans 
where adopted in line with the requirements of the new Building and Planning Act of 
1985. The year 2005 was chosen to be sure that the planning cycle of the particular plans 
in the study had been concluded.  
 
We shall concentrate in the main on the survey in light of the few general studies like 
ours in planning research. The questionnaire was sent to key actor groups involved in 
planning, i.e. politicians (mayors, politicians on municipal planning committees), 
planning administrations (chief municipal executives, heads of planning, planning 
officers), developers/construction firms (with more than eleven employees, selected from 
registers held by Statistics Norway), and local organisations (selected from the 
municipalities‟ own consultation lists and cultural heritage interests). Questionnaires 
were sent to some 3,600 respondents. The response rate was 20–65 per cent and was 
lowest from local associations and highest from mayors and chief municipal executives. 
Qualitative data based on semi-structured interviews was also obtained by our case 
studies in Oslo, Bergen and Trondheim municipalities.    8 
4.  Participation in development planning 
 
The minimum criterion for participating in planning derives from formal criteria in the 
Planning and Building Act on notification, consultation in terms of public inspection and 
the right of objection/appeal. The study of documents from Oslo, Bergen and Trondheim 
shows that consultations relative to the number of plans grew from thirty of the fifty 
plans studied in 1987 to forty of the fifty plans studied in 2005. The number of 
consultation responses per plan also rose. While the average number of consultations per 
plan was 8.5 in 1987, it was 15.2 by 2005. Consultation responses tend to come from 
landowners or residential and neighbourhood associations. We also asked the local 
organisations (N=221) whether they had (ever) taken part by submitting a consultation 
response. Of these, 66 per cent responded in the affirmative, this suggests that it is a 
fairly standard form of participation.  
 
The number of objections has grown too. The questionnaire asked heads of planning 
whether there had been a rise over the past five years in the number of objections, 
inquiries to the civil ombudsman and litigations. While there appears to have been no 
change in the number of inquiries to the civil ombudsman or in the number of law suits, 
half of the heads of planning reported that objections are now more numerous than 
before. Explanations for this may include the fact that densification in build-up areas 
creates more conflicts than urban extension and that planning privatisation increases the 
tension between private and public interests.   
 
Active involvement is generally given a great deal of attention in planning theory (e.g. 
Friedmann, 1987; Healey, 1997; Fiskaa, 2005). The actual frequency of participatory 
measures beyond the minimum required by law however seems rather limited. The 
document study thus shows that participation above a minimum level is rare. In only five 
of the hundred studied development plans was participation above the regulatory 
minimum. Most of this additional participation was in the form of public meetings. Local 
organisations reported that, 47 per cent had taken part in public meetings. Public 
meetings are not however the only form of participation where interested parties can 
exercise significant influence. In Arnstein‟s 1969 classification of influence via 
participation, the chance of making a real difference by participating in public meetings is 
very small indeed. The public has an opportunity to express its opinions on planning 
ideas or proposals. In other words, these meetings will occur at a late stage of the process 
(when a proposal is already drafted), often in the form of a meeting called in protest 
against the already drafted planning proposal. 
 
Several other Norwegian studies reveal the low prevalence of community participation 
beyond the statutory minimum in planning (Fiskaa, 2005; Wøhni, 2007; Netland, 2008; 
Windju, 2008; Schmidt et al., 2011). The new division of tasks, with developers actually 
planning urban developments, also gives them greater responsibility to ensure 
participation. Could the explanation for the low incidence of participatory measures be in 
part that the ideal of community participation is no longer considered very important by 
key planning actors? The questionnaire included questions designed to elucidate these 
attitudes. First we had a general proposition about the importance of ensuring community   9 
participation. This was followed by three propositions highlighting different reasons for 
this. The results are shown below. 
 
 
Figure 2: Attitudes towards participation in urban planning. Percentages stating 
“very important” and “quite important”. (N= 1000) 
 
Figure 2 clearly shows the clash of two value systems: planners and politicians wedded to 
the notions of community involvement and democracy and developers who are more 
aligned to economic rationality in their actions. Clearly then significant and systematic 
attitudinal differences exist between municipal actors and developers in respect of 
community participation. While politicians (mayors and political members of the 
standing planning committees) and planning administrators (chief municipal executive, 
head of planning, planning officers) are virtually unanimous in that nearly 80 per cent 
acknowledge the importance of securing community participation while the percentage of 
developers expressing the same sentiment is very much lower. These differences remain 
significant also after controlling for other variables (municipal size, organisations in the 
municipality and development activity). What these attitudinal differences tell us is that it 
could be difficult to get developers to do more to encourage community involvement 
beyond their statutory obligations.  
 
5.  Interaction patterns among actors 
 
What does the pattern of interaction among the different actors look like, and in which 
arenas does contact occur? We were particularly interested in our study in exploring 
interaction in the initial, informal planning stage, and the questionnaire therefore included 
questions on contact across all stages of the planning process. One would assume that the 
earlier the contact, the greater the chances would be of influencing the planning process 
(Holm, 2007). 
 
We find that ninety-five per cent of the responding municipalities had created internal 
procedures for handling submitted plans. Among these:    10 
  Ninety-one per cent report having procedures in place to facilitate preliminary 
conferences and advance meetings with developers.  
  Seventy-eight per cent report internal procedures for setting up development 
agreements.  
  The majority have procedures, moreover, for arranging internal meetings in the 
municipality (96 per cent) and meetings with other public authorities (87 per cent) 
to frame the planning process.  
  Eighty-two per cent have procedures in place for contacting local organisations 
concerning start-up and consultation matters. This relates primarily to public 
announcements in newspapers and routines for the provision of written 
information.  
 
All in all, this shows that the interaction arena between municipality and developer is 
highly developed and „proceduralised‟. This gives developers a structural advantage over 
local community actors.  
 
As regards the question of when interaction frequency is highest, the data reveals, 
perhaps rather surprisingly, that interaction between politicians on the planning 
committees and developers and local organisations peaks in the initial, informal stage. 
Sixty-seven and 62 per cent respectively report having interacted with these actors at this 
stage of every planning proposal. Since the role of politicians in the initial, informal stage 
is somewhat less defined, we were expecting the highest frequency to occur during the 
formal decision-making stage, when politicians give the plan their approval. Contact 
between these actors tails off slightly in the later stages – around 45–50 per cent of 
planning committee politicians report here having been in touch with the above-
mentioned actors in all cases – with the frequency of contact being relatively similar for 
both groups of actors. With regard to the mayors, the results show significantly less 
contact with developers and organisations in connection with development plans. We find 
no major difference between stages or between actor groups (developers, organisations).  
 
Turning to the planning administrations, we note that contact with the two external actor 
groups is much less balanced. While around 45 per cent of planning heads and planning 
officers report having consistently interacted with developers during the informal 
planning stage, fewer than 5 per cent report equally consistent interaction with local 
organisations at this stage. For the planning administration it would seem that contact 
with local organisations peaks in connection with consultations on the planning proposal 
during the formal stage – but even then, no more than 10 per cent of chief municipal 
executives, heads of planning and planning officers report always being in contact. 
Relations between planning administrations and developers are close. Sixty-seven per 
cent of developers are always in contact with the planning administration during the 
informal stage of planning. These findings echo those of previous Norwegian studies 
(Holm, 2007).  
 
Given that developers are now largely responsible for many planning tasks, we were also 
interested in whether they made an effort to get local organisations „on board‟ in terms of 
their planning decisions. According to our data, this is not particularly common and thus   11 
not much effort is made to bring this about. Only 3 per cent always establish contact with 
local organisations during this early stage of the planning process. Our data reveals, then, 
that little in the way of interaction takes place between local organisations and the 
planning administrations and developers during this informal planning stage. One 
consequence of this is that local organisations generally do not have an opportunity to 
make their opinions, interests and knowledge known early on when the plans are being 
drafted and basic principles laid down.  
 
In which arenas, or through which channels, does this interaction proceed? The 
formalised dialogue arena in the early drafting phase is generally thought to be between 
the planning administration and the developer (Røsnes, 2005; Nordahl, 2006). The survey 
confirms this. There, 91 per cent of the heads of planning have internal procedures for 
preliminary conferences and advance meetings with developers, and 78 per cent also 
have internal procedures for dealing with development agreements. We also asked 
developers and local organisations to tell us how, in general, contact with other actors is 
organised. The response is presented in the next table. 
 
   With local politicians  With planning 
administration 
With 
organisations 
With 
developers 
   Developers   Organisations  Developers  Organisations  Developers  Organisations 
Closed 
meetings 
27  20  90  27  7  14 
Open 
public 
meetings 
9  23  2  26  17  14 
Direct 
contact 
51  63  43  73  50  51 
N  98  201  98  201  98  201 
Table 1. Percentage of local organisations and developers reporting prevailing 
organisation of interaction between different actors in the planning process  
(N=201/98). 
 
 
This table highlights several interesting tendencies. First, we see that the most important 
interaction arena for contact between developer and municipality is the formal, closed 
meeting. Ninety per cent of the developers surveyed report that they consider closed 
meetings to be their most important method of interaction with the planning 
administration. Second, it appears that politicians are not normally represented at these 
meetings. Only 27 per cent of developers record this as the prevailing form of contact 
with politicians. This impression gains further credence from another finding. Planning 
administrations and developers are more likely than politicians to attest to a rise in the 
number of preliminary conferences and advance meetings with developers in recent 
decades. Politicians are, however, rarely involved in these meetings.  
   12 
Contact between local organisations and the municipality appears to take place in more 
informal arenas. Sixty-three per cent record direct contact as the prevailing mode of 
interacting with the planning administration, and 73 per cent with politicians. Developers 
of course interact directly; in their contact with politicians moreover it appears to be the 
main mode. The figures show thus show that contact with the municipality varies widely 
indeed between developers and local organisations. Developers have formalised arenas 
enabling contact with the planning administration while local organisations do not – and 
therefore resort to direct contact, primarily with politicians. The various parties in a 
planning process are therefore unequally placed to participate in and contribute to the 
discussions, deliberations and negotiations on development plans. 
 
Possibly the most interesting finding concerns the central role played by politicians as 
liaisons between the general public and the planning process. Other studies (Wøhni, 
2007; Schmidt et al., 2011) indicate that direct contact with politicians appears to be an 
important participatory channel for the local community. It remains, however, an 
informal channel and has not previously been systematically documented to any great 
extent. Our study has unequivocal evidence then that politicians are viewed and used as 
important links to the municipal planning process. Contact does not appear to be limited 
to the final stage, when the plan is up for political approval, but seems quite 
comprehensive throughout the whole planning process.  
 
6.  Does participation matter? 
 
Our findings suggest then that local communities are not drawn into planning beyond 
what is required by law. The consultation process, which is a formal minimum 
requirement, is generally used. The question however remains; does this type of 
participation by the local community affect planning outcomes? The questionnaire 
included questions on the impact of suggestions and contact with different actors in 
relation to the outcome of development plans. The results for local communities and 
developers are presented in the next figure. 
 
Figure 3 reveals some interesting differences. While nearly half of the local politicians 
consider submissions from the community to be important for the outcome of planning 
processes this is not a view generally shared by developers. Only 17 per cent of the latter 
group believe that contributions from the broader community influence the outcome of 
proceedings. The planning authority (chief municipal executive, head of planning, 
planning officers) consistently sees a weaker community influence in the outcome than 
politicians do. These differences proved significant even when we controlled them for 
other variables (such as municipal size, construction activity and political organisation in 
the municipality).  
 
The situation as conceived by the local organisations themselves corroborates the 
response of the developers: organisations have little influence on the outcome. Only 5 per 
cent of the organisations responded – to another question – that they feel their 
contribution actually brings about changes to the plan. W￸hni‟s (2007) study of thirteen 
development plans in which others were involved also found the highest satisfaction level   13 
in terms of the planning process among developers. Developers are accordingly more 
likely to have their views and opinions taken into account and acted upon, while involved 
community actors were not as satisfied, probably because their views were not taken as 
seriously.  
 
 
Figure 3: Percentage of respondents stating that contacts with other actors are 
“very important” for the outcome of the planning process (N=1221). 
 
 
One reason for the different perceptions in respect of community actors‟ influence could 
be the existence of different opinions among the actors on what it means to influence the 
outcome. Some actors conceive of influence as something that halts the process or that 
changes plans fundamentally, while for others, influence means to redefine minor details 
in the plan, such as where play areas are located, how many floors or apartments should 
be allowed, the location of green areas etc. Other studies show that neighbours and 
resident associations have to work very hard indeed to influence planning decisions 
leading to a fundamental revision of the premises of the project (Innes & Booher, 2004; 
Bickerstaff & Walker, 2005; Schmidt et al., 2011). When their opinions do lead to 
changes they are usually minor alterations such as adjusting building height or position. 
Several local community actors expressed - in the context of our interviews - a sense of 
frustration because so many of the important premises are set at an early stage.  
 
How much influence is ascribed to developers? In Holm‟s (2007) and Schmidt et al.’s 
(2011) study, politicians and heads of planning report feeling under more pressure from 
private contractors than from other actors. Are developers therefore assumed to exert 
greater influence on the outcome of the planning processes? Figure 3 reveals an 
interesting tendency: while politicians are slightly more likely to see contact with local 
organisations as important to the outcome of the development plan as contact with 
developers, we find the opposite pattern among actors in planning administrations.   14 
According to the chief municipal executives, heads of planning and planning officers, 
contact with developers has a greater effect on the outcome of planning than contact with 
actors from the local community. These numbers strengthen an impression of extensive 
interaction between developers and planning administrations in the drafting stage of 
development plans, where the plan‟s basic architecture is laid down. It also strengthens 
the impression that the community‟s contact with the municipality on matters relating to 
planning is mainly with the politicians.  
 
In planning, politicians have the last word, since they are the ones who approve or reject 
the plan. As we have shown, almost half of the politicians surveyed believe that 
suggestions emanating from the community can affect the outcome. But do politicians 
feel constrained to act on these ideas; or rather do they allow themselves to be bound by 
interaction and development agreements with developers? Figure 4 shows the percentage 
of politicians who feel bound by the various factors included in the list.  
 
 
 
Figure 4: To what degree do politicians feel a sense of obligation towards the 
following factors in urban planning? Percentages answering “great sense of 
obligation” and “significant sense of obligation”. (N=366). 
 
 
As the figure reveals, politicians are more likely to feel bound by formal participation of 
the public – either by way of consultation submissions or more comprehensive activities 
(public meetings, workshops etc.). Fewer, but nevertheless still one third, feel bound by 
the informal involvement of local community actors, which tends to be direct contact. 
This is interesting insofar as we found this to be the predominate channel into the 
municipal planning process that is available to local organisations. It would appear that   15 
politicians feel some sense of obligation, and allow themselves to be swayed by 
interaction with the local community.  
 
A surprising number of politicians feel bound by the municipality‟s negotiations with 
developers. Half report a sense of obligation to the municipality‟s advance negotiations 
on the development agreement; while a third report a sense of obligation in respect of 
preliminary conferences. This finding strengthens the impression of a political 
management of urban planning which rather than encapsulating the traditional, 
hierarchical approach, instead espouses a market and network-based approach to 
coordination. The findings also raise important questions over whether sufficient 
transparency, verifiability and participation in respect of third parties exits in those arenas 
where the most crucial negotiations clearly taken place. 
 
7.  Summing up 
 
Greater attention is now being given to the limitations of the new forms of governance 
such as market and network-based approaches. Such limitations apply to the involvement 
of third party interests during the first dialogue between the planning administration and 
developer, a stage at which important project premises are often laid down. Our study 
extends the contours of the challenges arising from these new forms of government. It 
shows, among other things, how planning processes bring two completely different 
systems of values face to face. The planning administration and local politicians, who 
represent planning expertise and common ideals, appear to value participation, seeing it 
as an important part of the democratic decision-making process. Developers are far less 
likely however to view community participation as an important element of the planning 
process. They rely to a greater degree on an economic rationale, with planning seen more 
as a necessary administrative check-box to be „ticked‟ before construction can get under 
way.  
 
One possibly quite surprising finding of our study is the higher frequency of interaction 
of local community actors with politicians than with planners in the municipality. This 
finding could inform new perspectives on planning. A significant proportion of the 
planning literature ascribes to planners the role of key actor, responsible for drawing the 
local community into deliberative planning processes (Healey, 1997; Cars et al., 2003; 
Innes & Booher, 2004; Agger, 2005). Our findings show, however, that Norwegian 
planning is, in practice, not like this at all. Here, planners are in touch with developers, 
and politicians with the public. The processes are typified by a contest for influence and 
position where the available channels of the planning process, politics and the media are 
used by developers and the local community alike.  
 
The broader planning process, moreover, clearly encompasses a much broader set of 
activities than that seen within the context of the formal planning process alone. Most of 
the actual planning activity, both in terms of time and content, seems to take place 
outside the formal planning process, and before the available planning legislation is used 
to outline the rules for the process and for participation within it. The planning process 
begins long before it reaches the public arena, and it often ends long after political   16 
decisions have been taken to accommodate objections and legal disputes. In other words, 
the planning process extends in both directions, and most of the important decisions are 
made outside the formal planning context. We note nonetheless that those actors with a 
formal role can become involved in the non-regulated stages of the planning process. The 
planning authority becomes an actor early in the process, and local community actors use 
political channels to influence matters directly.  
 
Our study in addition reveals the complexity and intricacy of patterns of interaction 
among actors involved in a given planning decision. There is contact between the various 
actors during nearly every stage of the process, but the scale and frequency of the contact 
varies widely. There is definitely more contact between developers and planning 
authorities in the early stages, and this is formalised in most municipalities. The study 
also finds broader interaction between local community actors and politicians, interaction 
which takes place later in the planning process than that between developer and planning 
authority. While contact between developer and planning authority can be defined as a 
positive network whose ultimate purpose is to implement a plan, contact between local 
community and politicians will often take the form of a protest against a proposal, a 
negative network.  
 
The study also shows how both positive and negative networks attempt to make use of as 
many of the available means of influence as they can, be they formal, political or media-
related. While the negative networks use formal means of influence inherent to the 
planning process (objections, consultations), the positive network acts for planners 
enabling them to make the best out of a planning process. Local community stakeholders 
will attempt to gain political influence by calling their politicians – community 
representatives– to account for their planning policies and decisions, while private actors 
will tend to direct attention towards political objectives such as urban development and 
house building to legitimise their plans. 
 
There is however clearly a potential danger here in the opening up of the planning system 
to market demands without addressing such questions in the context of an adjusted 
planning system. The challenge is not necessarily the new division of power and labour 
between the public and private sector in urban planning but rather that a predictable 
change, due to general development trends, has simply not been addressed in the 
planning system. We thus argue here that there is a clear need for stronger meta- planning 
where superior plans made by the local government within a democratic framework 
actually guide local development plans, and where the bias in power to market actors is 
corrected in the design of the planning process.  
 
It is also necessary to re-think the role of planning and the focus in planning theory. The 
planning literature tends to see the planner as the core actor in planning and planning as a 
universal tool for development. It is not like this at all, at least not in Norway. The 
planner is not the conductor in planning, and planning is one among many processes in 
urban development. We argue that much that passes for planning theory has, in reality, 
limited the focus on important actors, processes, power and interrelations in urban 
planning research.    17 
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